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TORT LAW-Foreseeability vs. Public Policy
Considerations in Determining the Duty of Physicians to
Non-Patients-Lester v. Hafl
[T]he problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence,
and... no universal test for it ever has been formulated.'

I. INTRODUCTION
In Lesterv. Hall,2 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a physician owes no

duty to a third party who is injured by the physician's patient as a result of
prescription drug side effects.3
Prior to the Lester decision, the only New Mexico case addressing physician

liability to third parties was Wilschinsky v. Medina.4 In that case, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that a physician did owe a duty to a third party injured by a
patient driving away from the physician's office immediately after the physician
injected the patient with a drug known to impair judgment and driving ability.5
However, the Wilschinsky court emphasized the intended narrowness of its holding.6
Thus, Lester reaffirms the court's admonition in Wilschinsky that physician liability
to third parties for medical malpractice is the exception, not the rule.
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June 1993, Dr. Hall, a licensed clinical psychiatrist, prescribed lithium7 for his
patient, Merlin Andersen, to treat his mood disorders After taking lithium for
approximately one month, Andersen reported to Dr. Hall that he had been feeling
"sick and shaky." 9 Despite these reported side effects, Dr. Hall increased
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 357-58 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter KEETON ET AL.].

2. 126 N.M. 404,970 P.2d 590(1998).
3. See id. at 405,970 P.2d at 591.
4.

108 N.M. 511,775 P.2d713 (1989).

5. See id.
at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
6. See id. (admonishing that its holding does not create a general duty to the "entire public for any injuries
suffered for which an argument of causation can be made"). The Wilschinsky court warned future courts to carefully
consider whether the facts of a particular case are appropriate for the extension of physician duty to third parties
under the Wilschinsky principles. See id.; see also Turpie v. Southwest Cardiology Assocs., 124 N.M. 787,790,
955 P.2d 716, 719 (1998) (noting that "the [Wilschinsky] court intended to limit Wilschinsky to its specific
circumstance" and that the court declined to "extend its rationale, as such, to the medical malpractice arena").
7. [Lithium carbonate] is indicated in the treatment of manic episodes of manic-depressive illness.
Maintenance therapy prevents or diminishes the intensity of subsequent episodes in those
manic-depressive patients with a history of mania. Typical symptoms of mania include pressure
of speech, motor hyperactivity, reduced need for sleep, flight ofideas, grandiosity, elation, poor
judgment, aggressiveness and possibly hostility. When given to a patient experiencing a manic
episode, [lithium carbonate] may produce a normalization of symptomatology within I to 3
weeks.
PHYSICLAN'S DESK REFERENCE 3051 (53d ed. 1999).
8. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Lester
v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404,970 P.2d 590 (1998) (No. 24,653). At the time Dr. Hall prescribed the lithium, Andersen
was also taking Zoloft (an antidepressant), Synthroid (a thyroid medication), and Diazepam (Valium), also
prescribed by Dr. Hall. See id.
9. See Plaintiffs Brief in Chief on Question Certified from the United States District Court at 5,.
Lester
(No. 24,653) (citing testimony of Hall at Medical-Legal Panel on July 30, 1996, from partial transcription at 15).
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Andersen's dose of lithium."° Five days after the dose increase, Andersen ran a red
light," struck the car in which Plaintiff Barbara Lester was a passenger, and
seriously injured her.'
At least twelve hours after taking his last lithium pill, a blood test at University3
of New Mexico Hospital revealed that Andersen's lithium level was 1.34 MEQ/L.'
This level was within the narrow therapeutic window of effectiveness for lithium,
but extrapolating back twelve hours, Andersen's level at the time of the accident
may have been toxic. 4
The prevalent literature and medically-recognized standard of care require a
prescribing physician to closely monitor the administration of lithium through
frequent blood testing. 5 The physician should also recognize physical symptoms
of toxicity exhibited by his patient and respond appropriately to them.'6
In addition to monitoring lithium levels through blood tests and clinical
observation of symptoms, the standard of care requires the prescribing physician to
discuss potential side effects with the patient. 7 The physician should also warn the
patient that these side effects could impair driving skills.'8 There are factual
disputes as to whether Dr. Hall warned Andersen of the possible side effects of
lithium and whether he followed the required standard of care for monitoring
lithium levels.' 9
Lester brought a personal injury action in federal court against Dr. Hall, and prior
to the trial, Judge Parker certified the following question to the New Mexico
Supreme Court:2 °
Does a physician owe a legal duty to a non-patient who is injured in a collision
with a motor vehicle, operated by the physician's patient, who was last treated

10. See Plaintiff's Brief in Chief at 5, Lester (stating that Dr. Hall raised Andersen's dose from 900 mg per

day to 1200 mg per day) (citing deposition of Anderson at 23 and testimony of Hall at 17)).
11. Andersen has no conscious memory of the period of time immediately preceding the accident. See letter
of Oct. 17, 1994 from Merlin Andersen to Judge James F. Blackmer at 2 (on file with the New Mexico Law
Review).
12. See Lester v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404,405,970 P.2d 590,591 (1998).
13. See Univ. of New Mexico Hosp. Toxicology Report, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at Ex. A,Lester (No. 24,653), cited in November 14,1994 Deposition
of Andersen at 7. Note that this was Andersen's first and only lithium level check after taking the drug for over a
month. See Plaintiffs Brief in Chief at 4, Lester.
14. Patients with lithium serum levels of 2.0 to 3.0 MEQ/L are suffering from mild to moderate intoxication
and are usually conscious, although they are experiencing "acute brain syndrome-confusion, disorientation,
memory and intellectual impairment... [with] varying degrees of neuro-muscular irritation and disturbance." See
F. NEn JOHNSON, HANDBOOK OF InmUM THERAPY 286 (1980).

15. See Affidavit of Fredman I 4a, Lester. Initially, testing should be done every 2-3 days. See JOHNSON,
supra note 14, at 13.
16. See Affidavit of Fredman 4c, Lester,JOHNSON, supranote 14, at 15. Barbara Lester filed suit against
Dr. Hall for allegedly committing malpractice by failing to properly monitor Andersen's lithium levels, failing to
adequately warn him ofpotential side effects of the treatment, and failing to recognize that Andersen was suffering
symptoms of lithium toxicity. See Complaint for Damages Under New Mexico's Medical Malpractice Act at 3,
Lester. Lester claimed that Dr. Hall owed a legal duty to her, he breached this duty during the course of his
treatment of Andersen, and his breach was a proximate cause of her injuries and damages. See id.
17. See JOHNSON, supra note 14, 287.
18. See Affidavit of Fredman I 4b, Lester.
19. See Lester, 126 N.M. 405,970 P.2d at 590 at 591.
20. See id. at 404, 970 P.2d at 590 (noting that Judge Parker certified the question pursuant to N.M. R. APp.
P. 607 regarding certification from federal courts).
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by the physician five days before the collision, and whose ability to drive a
vehicle allegedly was impaired by medications prescribed by the physician, who
(1) allegedly improperly monitored his patient's medication and (2) allegedly

failed to warn his patient that the medication could impair the patient's driving
ability?2
The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted certification of this question and, after

full briefing and oral argument, answered the certified question in the negative,
holding that Dr. Hall did not owe a duty to Barbara Lester stemming from his
treatment of Andersen.

Ill.

BACKGROUND

Before a negligent defendant can be held liable for a plaintiff's damages, the
court must determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise

ordinary care.' From a moral viewpoint, one might argue that every person has a
duty to exercise ordinary care toward every other person in the performance of
every imaginable task.24 Recognizing that this unbounded definition of duty would

be impossible to enforce, common law courts have limited the universe of duty.
They have chosen to impose a duty of care on a defendant only when the plaintiff's

injury is foreseeable25 and when the imposition of a duty is consistent with public
policy.26 In the process of assigning liability, the judge is responsible for answering
the legal question of whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and, if a

duty is owed, the jury is responsible for answering the factual question of whether
the defendant breached his duty.27

Duty: A Question of Foreseeabilityand Policy
Foreseeability is the centerpin of Justice Benjamin Cardozo's majority opinion
in Palsgrafv. Long Island RailroadCo,'2 "the most discussed and debated of all
torts cases ...." In Palsgraf,Chief Judge Cardozo, speaking for a majority of four
members of the New York Court of Appeals, found the defendant not liable for lack

21. Id.
22. See id.at405, 970P.2dat591.
23. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59,62,792 P.2d 36,39 (1990).
24. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "(d]ue care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to
protect A, B, or C alone").
25. See Catkins, 110 N.M. at 62,792 P.2d at 39 (citing the majority opinion in Palsgrqffor the proposition
that "[a] plaintiff must show that defendant's actions constituted a wrong against him, not merely that defendant
acted beneath a required standard of care") (emphasis added).
26. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 358 (explaining that "'duty' is... an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection").
27. See Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61,66,792 P.2d at 38, 43.
28. The facts of Palsgraf are as follows: As plaintiff stood on a platform of defendant's railroad, a train
stopped at the station and two men ran forward to catch it. One of the men, carrying a package, jumped aboard the
car, but appeared unsteady as if he were about to fall. A guard on the car, who had held the door open, reached
forward to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. In this act, the package was
dislodged and fell on the rails. The package contained fireworks that exploded when it fell. The shock of the
explosion threw down a set of scales at the other end of the platform. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing the
injuries for which she sued. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99 (N.Y. 1928).
29. KEETON ET AL,supra note 1,at 284.
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of a duty owed to the plaintiff." Negligence, Chief Judge Cardozo said, was a
matter of relation between the parties, which must be founded upon the
foreseeability of harm to the person injured.3" Cardozo stated that "[tihe risk
reasonably to be perceived defines duty ...it is risk to another or to others within
the range of apprehension." 32
On the other hand, Judge Andrews, writing in dissent in Palsgraf,opined that
everyone owes a duty to the world at large to refrain from acts that unreasonably

threaten the safety of others. 3 He argued that "[n]ot only is he wronged to whom

harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even
'
if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone." Judge
Andrews pointed out that foreseeability is not a requirement: "It does not matter that
[the injuries] are.. . unforeseeable. But... [tihe damages must be so connected
with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the
former."35 Judge Andrews then gave the meaning of proximate cause in his
approach to defining duty as "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point." 36 Thus, Judge Andrews would not require foreseeability for duty, but
would require a connectedness based on public policy.
In Calkins v. Cox Estates, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the
concept of foreseeability in tort as integral to duty.37 Relying on the famous Cardozo
opinion in Palsgraf,the Calkinscourt required the plaintiff to show himself "within
actions" in order to prove
the zone of foreseeable danger created by the defendant's
38
care.
reasonable
use
to
duty
a
had
defendant
the
The Calkins court also recognized that public policy was established by New
Mexico's precedent as key to determining duty.39 When faced with public policy

30.
31.
32.
33.

See Pasgraf,162 N.E. at 101.
See id.
Id. at 100.
See id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).

dissenting).
34. id. (Andrews, J.,
35. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
37. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (1990). The facts of Calkins are as
follows: Eight year old Daniel Enriquez lived with his grandparents in an apartment complex owned by the
defendant. There was a playground behind the apartment complex that Eniquez was playing in on the day in
question. Behind the playground was an arroyo leading to the Metropolitan Flood Control ditch, and then to an
unfenced road adjoining Interstate 25, approximately 945 feet away. The playground was separated from the arroyo
by a fence built by the landlord, but the fence had fallen into disrepair. Enriquez escaped through a hole in the fence
and was killed by a car on the frontage road. See id.
38. See id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
39. See id. at 63,792 P.2d at 40; see also Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at 8, Lester v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404, 970 P.2d 590 (1998) (No. 24,653) (describing
New Mexico's law of duty as well-grounded in the legal/policy component of foreseeability, as distinguished from
the factual component of foreseeability). See, e.g., Solon v. W.E.K. Drilling Co. Inc., 113 N.M. 566, 569, 829 P.2d
645, 648 (1992) (reaffirming that the issue of duty is one of social policy by defining duty as "where to draw the
line against otherwise unlimited liability," and treating foreseeability as only one aspect of that policy analysis).

Chief Justice Ransom explained that "while Chief Judge Cardozo held in Palsgrafthat there can be no duty in
relation to another person absent foreseeability ('risk reasonably to be perceived'), it does not follow that duty
necessarily is present if risk of injury to that other person isforeseeable from one's acts and omissions." Id. at 572
(Ransom, C.J., specially concurring). Justice Ransom agreed with the social policy determination because it was
"not reasonable to impose a duty to avoid" the risk at issue in Solon. See id. at 573; see also Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi
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questions, the New Mexico courts first rely on the state legislature as the primary
exposition of the public policy of the state,' then balance the policy interests
involved."
The Calkins court established that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
based on the landlord-tenant relationship by referencing New Mexico statutes and
common law.42 Having established a duty to maintain common areas reserved for
tenants, the court looked to the foreseeability of the injury to establish the scope of
the duty.43 According to the majority, it was reasonably foreseeable that Enriquez,
a tenant of defendant's apartment complex, would be harmed as a result of
defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the fence enclosing
the playground behind the complex.'
Judge Andrews' policy-based approach in determining duty in his Palsgraf
dissent is still advanced, however. For example, Justice Ransom argued in his
Calkins dissent that the crux of the duty analysis is a legal policy determination
where foreseeability is not controlling.45 The policy issue is whether it is reasonable
to impose a duty to avoid a risk of injury which, although foreseeable, is remote. 4
Therefore, as a matter of public policy, absent an affrmative undertaking relied
upon by the tenants,4 7 Ransom stated that it was not reasonable to require the
landlord to prevent Enriquez from leaving his apartment complex."8

Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393,395,925 P.2d 510, 512(1996) (recognizing the need for a"bright-fine
test" in determining duty). The particular bright-fine test adopted in Gabaldonarose out of the court's recognition
that "boundaries, however arbitrary" are needed to protect "against fraudulent claims and the expansion of [tort]
liability out of all proportion to the tortfeasor's fault." See id. at 396, 925 P.2d at 513.
40. See id. See, e.g., New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 through 41-4-27 (1996 &
Supp. 1999). In 1976, the New Mexico Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act "in response to the judicial
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588,592, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975)." See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-1 (1999). The basic intent of the act was to reestablish governmental immunity while creating specific
exceptions for which the government could be sued for tort liability. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Risk
Management Div., 120 N.M. 178,899 P.2d 1132 (1995). The legislature listed the following public policy concerns
tojustify its retention of partial governmental immunity:
(1)... protect[ion] [of) the public treasuries; (2).. .[the ability to] function unhampered by the
threat of time and energy consuming legal actions which would inhibit the administration of
traditional state activities; and (3)... [a desire] to effectively carry out its services, many of
which are financially unprofitable and which would not be provided at a reasonable cost by

private enterprise ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 (1999).
41. See Calkins, 110 N.M. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40.
42. See id. (obliging an owner to "keep common areas of the premises in a safe condition"); Torres v. Piggly
Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 93 N.M. 408,411,600 P.2d 1198,1201 (CL App. 1979), cert. denied,93 N.M. 683,
604 P.2d 821 (1979) (holding a landlord liable for a slip and fall injury in a parking lot on leased premises where
the landlord assumed responsibility and control over the parking lot)); N.M. UJ.L Civ. 13-1314 (stating a
landlord's duty to use ordinary care in making improvements or repairs), 1315 (stating landlord's duty to use
ordinary care to keep common premises in safe condition); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360 (1965)
(affirming a lessor's liability for lessee's harm when caused by a dangerous condition upon land within the lessor's
control if the lessor could have discovered the condition by the exercise of reasonable care).
43. See Calkins, 110 N.M. at 65,792 P.2d at 42.
44. See id. Whether the defendant breached his duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe
condition was a question of fact for the jury to answer on remand. See id. at 66,792 P.2d at 43.
45. See id. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
46. See id (Ransom, J., dissenting).
47. The majority in Calkinsfound an affmnative undertaking by the landlord. See id. at 64, 792 P.2d at 41.
48. See id. at 68, 792 P.2d at 45 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
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Liability to Third Parties
A more specific duty question to which both policy and foreseeability are
relevant is the extension of duty to third parties, i.e., injured persons who were not
the original victim of the tortfeasor's negligence. Because foreseeability of harm is
always somewhat attenuated in third-party cases, they lend themselves to a public
policy analysis.
New Mexico has an extensive history of cases in which its courts have held
°
tortfeasors liable to third parties.49 Examples include: Lopez v. Maez (finding a
duty owed by people serving alcohol to highways travelers), Torres v. State of New
public
Mexico5" (imposing a duty on police to unidentified members of the general
52
with respect to law enforcement activities), Ramirez v. Armstrong (extending
tortfeasor duties to third-party bystanders and spouses of victims), and Steinbergv.
Coda Robertson Construction Co. 53 (finding professional duties to non-clients).
ProfessionalMalpractice
Despite the rich history of New Mexico cases relating to liability to third parties,
the only case in New Mexico concerning physician duty to third parties for
malpractice before Lester was Wilschinsky v. Medina.' In Wilschinsky, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that a physician owed a duty to a member of the public
the physician
who might be injured by a patient's impaired ability to drive after
55
office.
physician's
the
in
drugs
powerful
with
injected the patient
Wilschinsky filed suit in district court against Helen Medina, the driver of the car
that struck and injured him. He amended his complaint to join Dr. Michael Straight,
alleging that Dr. Straight negligently administered two drugs known to cause
drowsiness and impair judgment to Medina.' Noting that the question was one of
first impression, the court borrowed the three-pronged balancing test from Kirk v.
Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center" as the proper method of determining
the duty of a medical provider to third parties injured by the doctor's patient. Under
the Kirk standard, the Wilschinsky court analyzed (1) the likelihood of injury to the

49. See Plaintiff's Brief in Chief at 9, Lester.

50. 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (finding the extension of duty beyond the patron to the general
public appropriate because the consequences of serving liquor to an intoxicated person whom the server knows or
could know is driving a car is reasonably foreseeable in fight ofthe use of automobiles and the increasing frequency
of accidents involving drunk drivers).
51. 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386(1995).
52. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); see also Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994).
53. 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968) (holding that a contractor was liable for defects discovered by the
subsequent purchaser, even though there was no direct contractual relationship between them); see also Wisdom
v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.M. 1982); Leyba v. Whitley, 120 N.M. 768, 907 P.2d 172 (1995) (finding that an
attorney could be liable to one who was not his client but was the statutory beneficiary of wrongful death proceeds
the attorney had recovered for the personal representative); Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713
(1989).
54. 108 N.M. 511,775 P.2d 713 (1989).
55. See id. at 517,775 P.2d at 719.
56. See id. at 511, 775 P.2d at 713.
57. 513 N.E.2d 387 (i11.1987).
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plaintiff, (2) the magnitude of the burden to the doctor of guarding against the injury
and (3) the potential consequences of placing that burden on the doctor.58
The Wilschinsky court found that the likelihood of a vehicular accident
immediately following the injection of a narcotic in combination with other drugs
was great.59 Under the second prong of the Kirk test, the court found that when the
narcotic is administered by a doctor in his office, the burden of guarding against
foreseeable danger is not unreasonable.' Finally, under the third prong, the court
determined that if the scope of the doctor's duty is limited to the professional
standards of acceptable medical practice, the additional burden on the doctor's
treatment decisions is negligible.6 ' Thus, under the Kirk balancing test, the
Wilschinksky court determined that Dr. Straight owed a duty to the driving public
when he administered the drugs to Medina under those particular circumstances.62
In addition to applying the Kirk test, the Wilschinsky court surveyed decisions
from foreign jurisdictions that had grappled with the policy question of physician
liability to third parties and was persuaded by the reasoning of those jurisdictions
that found a duty to third parties.63 Combining the results of its Kirk analysis with
its determination that a majority of foreign jurisdictions found that the policy
compelled such a duty, the Wilschinsky court held that Dr. Straight owed a duty to
Wilschinsky.
IV. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
The Lester court's analysis of duty is legitimately concerned with both
foreseeability and public policy, just as the Kirk standards combine a foreseeability
inquiry and a public policy inquiry.
Foreseeability
The three-pronged Kirk test required the Lestercourt to assess the likelihood of
Barbara Lester's injury, the magnitude ofthe burden on Dr. Hall of guarding against
it, and the potential consequences of placing that burden on Dr. Hall.
In applying the first prong, the Lester court found that, because the effect of
lithium on driving abilities was far less certain than the effect of the narcotic in
Wilschinsky, it was less foreseeable that a person taking lithium would cause a car
accident.6 In addition to acknowledging that the effect of lithium on driving
abilities is uncertain, the Lestercourt may have been at least partially persuaded by
58. See Wilschinsky, 108 N.M. at 513, 775 P.2d at 715.
59. See id. at 514,775 P.2dat 716.
60. See id "The additional burden placed on doctors by this opinion is negligible because the duty we
recognize is consistent with professional standards in the medical community and the liability falls under the rubric
of the Medical Malpractice Act.... Id at 515,775 P.2d at 717.
61. See id at 514, 775 P.2d at717. In the medical profession, doctors must use reasonable care based on
any superior learning, experience, skills, knowledge or training they personally have over and above the normal
professional standards. See KEETON ET. AL., supra note 1,at 185 (citing Prooth v. Wallsh, 432 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y.
Sup. 1980)).
62. See Wilschinsky, 108 N.M. at 515,775 P.2d at 717.
63. See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (rex. App. 1983); Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges,
606 S.W.2d 521,527 (Tenn. 1980), Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576. 578 (Iowa 1973); Kaiser v. Suburban
Transport Systems, 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965).
64. See Lester v. Hall, 126 N.M. 404,406,970 P.2d 590,592 (1998).
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the argument of the New Mexico Medical Society that the symptoms Andersen
described to Dr. Hall during his appointment on July 15th were not caused by
lithium. 65 At the time Andersen experienced the reported symptoms, a policeman
was monitoring him while he inventoried possessions in his garage that were being
divided in a painful divorce on a hot and sticky July day.' 6 The stress of these
conditions, rather than lithium side effects, may have caused Andersen's symptoms.
The New Mexico Medical Society argued in the alternative that if Andersen really
did experience shakiness (hand tremor) as a result of his lithium therapy, it was an
innocuous side effect that did not present a danger to him.67
The second prong of the Kirk test required the Lester court to analyze the
magnitude of the burden on the physician of guarding against the harm to the third
party. In applying this prong, the Lestercourt determined that assigning such a duty
to Dr. Hall would be too burdensome." The court contrasted the Lester facts with
those in Wilschinsky, where the administration of narcotics in the doctor's office
under his direction and timing made reasonable preventative measures of whatever
type easier to implement.69 At the same time, the in-office administration created
a higher degree of patient reliance on the doctor's professional judgment.70
In Wilschinsky, however, the court applied the second Kirk factor and found that
if a duty to third parties would only necessitate applying regularly accepted medical
standards, it would not be an undue burden. 7 Acceptable medical standards require
a physician to regularly monitor his patient's lithium level,72 and to warn his patient
of the possible side effects of lithium therapy.73 Under the Wilschinsky approach,
Dr. Hall could have fulfilled any duty he might have to Lester by adequately
fulfilling his duty to Andersen. The Lester court sidestepped this aspect of
Wilschinsky and focused instead on the factual distinction between the two cases.
The third prong of the Kirk test required an attempt to predict the consequences
of placing a burden upon the defendant. The Lester court concluded that, if it
extended a duty from Hall to Lester, the duty would cause a "potentially chilling
effect on the use of prescription medication in medical care"'74 and a "potential
intrusion upon the indispensable loyalty which physicians must maintain towards
their patients regarding their medical care and treatment decisions."7 5 The court
opined that "doctors should not be asked to weigh notions of liability in their
already complex universe of patient care."76

65. See New Mexico Medical Society Amicus Brief at 10, Lester (No. 24,653).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Lester, 126 N.M. at 406, 970 P.2d at 592.
69. See id.
70. See Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 514-15, 775 P.2d 713, 716-17 (1989).
71. See id. at 515,775 P.2d at 717. Lester is a more compelling duty case than Wilschinsky because, here,
proper medical treatment by Dr. Hall would have entirely prevented the medical condition in Andersen which
allegedly caused Lester's injuries. In Wilschinsky, on the other hand, the physician was required to take additional
steps beyond his medical treatment to protect the motoring public. See Plaintiff's Brief in Chief at 12-23, Lester.

72. See supra text accompanying note 15.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 287.
See Lester, 126 N.M. at 407, 970 P.2d at 593.
See id.
See id. (citing Wischinsky, 108 N.M. at 516, 775 P.2d at 718).
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Based on the three-pronged Kirk analysis, the court found that the facts of Lester
did not warrant extending a duty to Dr. Hall for the injuries Andersen caused to
Lester.
Public Policy
In undertaking its policy analysis, the Lestercourt first explained that policy also
determines duty and it is the particular domain of the legislature, as the voice of the
people, to create public policy." The court then reasoned that the legislature,
through the Medical Malpractice Act,78 had acted to limit health care79providers'
liability out of a concern for the health of the citizens of New Mexico.
The legislature's stated purpose in enacting the Medical Malpractice Act was to
"promote the health and welfare of the people of New Mexico by making available
8
professional liability insurance for health care providers in New Mexico." " The
legislature's determination that health care providers' liability must be limited in
order to assure New Mexicans' access to medical care is demonstrated by damage
2 and required evaluation and decision by the
caps,8' a shorter statute of limitations,
83
commission.
review
medical
The Lester court reasoned that the most effective way it could prioritize the
public health and welfare of New Mexicans was by not imposing a duty on Dr. Hall
and thus, help to ensure continuing access to health care." An imposition of duty
in this case may have made it more difficult, and therefore less attractive, to practice
medicine in New Mexico because of the expanded tort liability. This could in turn
lead to a shortage of physicians and a resulting difficulty for New Mexicans in
obtaining quality health care.
In expanding its public policy analysis, the court appears to have been swayed
by several arguments made by the New Mexico Medical Society. First, the court
was persuaded that if psychiatrists were held to have a duty to third persons because
of side effects caused by effective treatment, it would result in an enormous
8
disincentive against treating any potentially risky patient. " Second, were the court
to impose a duty on a physician to consider the risk of harm to third persons before
prescribing medication to a patient, it would force the physician to weigh the

77. See Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995) (recognizing that "[clourts should
make policy in order to determine duty only when the body politic has not spoken and only with the understanding
that any misperception of the public mind may be corrected shortly by the legislature").
78. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to 29 (1996 & Supp. 1999). The legislature drafted the Medical Malpractice
Act in response to the 1970s insurance crisis to promote the health and welfare of the people of New Mexico by
securing the availability of professional liability insurance for health care providers. See id. The Act also imposed
damage caps on malpractice claims, created a shorter statute of limitations for malpractice actions and required
an evaluation of malpractice claims by the medical review commission. See idL
79. See id.; see also Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. at 516,775 P.2d at 718 (discussing the purpose of
the Medical Malpractice Act).
80. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-2 (1996).
81. See id. § 41-5-6.

82. See id § 41-5-13 (three year statute of limitaions); cf id § 37-1-3 (1990) (six-year statute of
limitations).
83. See id. § 41-5-15.
84. See Lester, 126 N.M. at 407-08, 970 P.2d at 593-4.
85. See New Mexico Medical Society Amicus Brief at 16, Lester.
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welfare of unknown people against the welfare of his own patient.86 In this situation,
a physician might refrain from prescribing beneficial drugs for his patient if he
thought the risk of liability to third parties was too high.
After applying the Kirk balancing test and surveying the case law and relevant
public policy concerns of New Mexico, the court acknowledged that there was a
split in authority in cases from other jurisdictions.87 The Lester court declined to
adopt any of the specific factors enumerated in the foreign cases. It did find,
however, that the policy considerations underlying the cases that did not impose a
third-party duty on physicians were much more compelling than those cases that
extended a general duty from physicians to third parties in prescription cases. 8
Interestingly, this determination about policy considerations is directly
contradictory to the determination by the Wilschinsky court, which was persuaded
by the reasoning of jurisdictions that did find a duty to third parties.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The effect of the Lester decision on New Mexico law is unclear, primarily
because it did not overturn Wilschinsky and because of the way in which it
distinguished that case. Wilschinsky remains good law with respect to the injection
of narcotic drugs in the office where the physician has control over the patient, thus
leaving some uncertainty in those cases that have attributes of both Lester and
Wilschinsky.

For example, suppose that a physician prescribes a narcotic instead of lithium
and his patient subsequently injures a third party as a result of the drug's side

86. See id. at 17 (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991)).
87. See Lester, 126 N.M. at 409, 970 P.2d at 595. ihe Lester court cites the following cases from foreign
jurisdictions that hold a physician owes a duty to third party non-patients for negligently prescribing medication:
Watkins v. United States, 589 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding a physician owed a duty under Alabama
law to a third party when prescribing Valium to a patient, even though the patient had a 0.16 blood alcohol level);
Zavalas v. State Dept. of Corrections, 861 P.2d 1026, 1027-29 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a physician who
negligently prescribed medicine to his heroin-addicted patient owed a duty to third parties); Kaiser v. Suburban
Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965) (holding, without a discussion of duty, that a physician who failed to
warn a bus driver of side effects of medication which may cause drowsiness owed a duty to injured bus passenger);
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159,161-63 (Wis. 1988) (finding that a defendant therapist was negligent when
failing to warn patient of a medication's side effects, failing to warn the patient's family, and failing to seek
commitment of the patient). Conversely, the court cites the following jurisdictions as rejecting the proposition that
physicians owe a duty to third parties for the negligent prescription of drugs: Estate of Warner v. United States,
669 F. Supp. 234, 235-37 (N.D. 111.1987) (concluding a doctor who allegedly prematurely released a psychiatric
patient who was experiencing intoxication from barbiturates did not owe a duty to a third party non-patient because
no special relationship existed); Werner v. Varner, Stafford & Seaman, P.A., 659 So. 2d 1308, 1309-10 (Fla. App.
1995) (holding that a doctor did not owe a duty to a third party even though he failed to warn a patient not to drive
while under the influence of an epilepsy medicine because Florida has "specifically limited the physician's duty
to known and identifiable parties" such as mother and child); Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995-97 (Ind. 1991)
(finding that a doctor who prescribed anabolic steroids to a patient who subsequently shot the plaintiff owed no
duty to the plaintiff because no "contract, special relationship, privity or reliance" existed between the plaintiff and
the doctor); Conboy v. Mogeloff, 172 A.2d 912, 961-62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a doctor owes no duty
to a patient because a defendant has no legal duty to control the third party's conduct); Rebollal v. Payne, 145
A.D.2d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (reasoning that a physician "does not undertake a duty to the public at large");
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387,395-99 (111.1987) (concluding that "no patient-doctor
relationship" between the defendant doctors and the plaintiff existed and no special relationship existed between
the patient and the plaintiff).
88. See Lester, 126 N.M. at 412, 970 P.2d at 598.
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effects. The physician would lack control of the patient, as Dr. Hall did in Lester,
but the potential danger of the drug would be higher, as it was with the injected
narcotic in Wilschinsky. A court could find, despite the lack of physician control,
that the dangerous nature of the drug is sufficient to extend a third-party duty to the
physician. Such an finding would emphasize foreseeability in determining a duty
existed. Or, the court could hold that the lack of physician control is the critical
factor and not extend a third party duty to the physician as a matter of policy.
Next, imagine that a physician administers a non-narcotic drug to a patient in his
office and the patient, experiencing side-effects from the drug, injures a third party
while driving home. In all ways except for the nature of the drug, this fact pattern
is analogous to Wilschinsky. A court could reasonably hold as a matter of public
policy that, because the patient was under the physician's control when he ingested
the drug, the physician is liable to the third party despite the milder nature of the
drug in question. Or, a court may find that the injury to the third party was not
foreseeable because the drug did not generally cause dangerous side effects and
hold the physician not liable.
Without knowing the critical element of either the Lester or the Wilschinsky fact
patterns from the court's perspective, the implications of these decisions on
physician liability to third parties remains a guessing game.
VI. CONCLUSION
Assuming that Wilschinsky is a narrow exception to a general rule of not
imposing liability on third parties, it is critical to determine what it is about the
Lester fact pattern that distinguishes it from Wilschinsky. Whether it is the nature
of the drug in question, the in-office administration of the drug, or some other
criterion, physicians need to understand, for their own peace of mind, how their
actions might expose them to liability to third parties.
Unfortunately for physicians in New Mexico, the Lester decision does not make
the critical distinction entirely clear. Physicians have no choice except to live with
this ambiguity until the New Mexico Supreme Court issues an opinion that helps
us better understand the parameters of liability to third parties.
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